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THE AUTO-FINANCE CONSENT DECREE
THE AUTO-FINANCE CONSENT DECREE: A NEW
TECHNIQUE IN ENFORCING THE
SHERMAN ACT
HAROLD F. BIRNBAUMt
On May 18, 1938, the Attorney General of the United States
made an announcement" introducing the practice of issuing
public statements to set forth the policy of the Department of
Justice with regard to anti-trust laws. Such statements are
intended to furnish a guide to businessmen on the probable
action of the Department of Justice in similar circumstances;
to aid the Department in formulating a consistent enforcement
policy; to warn those engaged in what the Attorney General
characterizes as "similar illegal practices"; and to call the atten-
tion of Congress to the interpretation and application of the
anti-trust laws by the Attorney General.
Coincidentally with the Attorney General's announcement, the
Department issued a statement regarding the automobile financ-
ing case.' This has since been followed by important statements
on the second Madison Oil case,3 Chicago Milk and Ice Cream
investigation,' the Motion Picture suit,5 and the Medical Monop-
oly suit.'
In connection with the automobile financing matter, it is com-
mon knowledge that during the fall of 1937, while evidence
regarding alleged violations of the Sherman Act was being pre-
sented to the Grand Jury in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, discussions
looking to a possible consent decree were taking place at the
same time at Washington between the Department of Justice
and the prospective defendants, three large automobile manu-
facturers, and several finance companies. United States Dis-
trict Judge Geiger, upon learning of these discussions, and after
t A.B., University of Colorado, 1920; LL.B., Harvard University, 1923.
Attorney, Commercial Investment Trust Corporation.
1. (1988) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,001.
2. (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,002. See also the state-
ment of November 7, 1938, when these decrees were presented to the court
(1988) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,011.
3. (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,003.
4. Id. at par. 17,004.
5. Id. at par. 17,005.
6. Id. at par. 17,006.
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hearing various counsel involved, discharged the Grand Jury on
December 17, 1937, with the following statement:
I do not think it was proper for these parties to get together
during the session of this grand jury and negotiate a deal
here in a matter that would be comprehended within the
terms of a probable indictment. There is nothint to do here
but to discharge the grand jury. The clerk will enter an
order to that effect.7
In the automobile finance statement,8 after referring to the
foregoing incident, the Department summarized its policy as
follows: The Department will not compromise a criminal case
upon an agreement by the defendants to refrain from repeating
the violations with which they are charged; while the commence-
ment of a criminal prosecution does not abolish the presump-
tion of innocence, the Department regards such action as an-
nouncing that it possesses "evidence of violation of law which
it deems so compelling that it cannot accept the responsibility of
ignoring it"; the concurrent use of civil and criminal proceed-
ings is not intended "to coerce or compel the prospective defend-
ants to consent to a civil settlement on threat of criminal prose-
cution"; the Department will consider proposals for consent de-
crees and if such proposals, in addition to prohibiting violations
with which the respective defendants are charged, offer "sub-
stantial public benefits" connected with the policy of maintain-
ing fre6 competition in an orderly market which could not be
obtained by the criminal prosecution, the Department will pre-
sent them to the court.9
The pronouncement is also made that such proposals must be
voluntary and that the Department does not invite their sub-
mission. This statement is obviously intended by the Depart-
7. 2 Hearing before Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, with regard to the official conduct of
Judge Ferdinand A. Geiger, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin (1938) 111. Judge Geiger also said, "Now, then, that
being done and with the co-pendency of a Grand Jury session, it is my judg-
ment that the Department did not have the power to negotiate with these
companies, and I call it 'negotiation' deliberately; did not have the power
to negotiate with these parties for a consent decree."
8. See note 2, supra.
9. If such proposals are made after indictment they will be submitted as
the basis for a nolle prosequi in the public interest. If submitted while the
matter is still pending before the Grand Jury, the Judge will be informed
of the proposals so that, if he considers it desirable, they may be presented
to the Grand Jury for consideration in connection with the evidence.
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ment as an answer to the charge of coercion. Although the De-
partment states that "an indictment for violation of the anti-
trust laws does not necessarily charge a crime involving moral
turpitude," 10 and that the proposed proceeding against the Amer-
ican Medical Association should be compared to "a prosecution
for reckless driving, committed by a person of distinction and
good will who is in a hurry to meet his legitimate engagements," '1
it nevertheless regards criminal proceedings as "most useful as
a deterrent."' 2 It also recites that the avowed purpose of the
statements is "to create an atmosphere which leaves the door
open to a constructive proposal at any stage of the litigation."'' 3
Moreover, in the statement in the Motion Picture suit, the De-
partment announced the abandonment of its previous technique
of approving business practices in advance through private
conferences with representatives of an industry whose opera-
tions involve anti-trust questions.
Accordingly, it must be evident that the new technique in
enforcing the Sherman Act"4 is to confront members of an in-
dustry, against whom the Department has evidence which it
believes to be substantial, with the alternative of a criminal
prosecution or the tender of a consent decree which, in the
judgment of the Department, offers substantial public benefits
which could not be obtained by the criminal prosecution.
Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold, in an address
on June 15, 1938, which was broadcast over two national hook-
ups, stated:
10. Medical Monopoly Suit statement (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg.
Serv. par. 17,006.
11. Ibid.
12. Chicago Milk and Ice Cream statement (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. par. 17,004. Since the Attorney General's statement of May 18,
the Department has proceeded criminally in all matters on which it has
issued a statement, except (1) in the Motion Picture Suit where two rea-
sons were given for proceeding in equity; first, that divorce of the owner-
ship of theatres from production and distribution facilities could only be
accomplished through an equity decree, and second, because prior dealings
between the Department and the industry made it inequitable to institute a
general criminal proceeding relating to the general subject matter. Motion
Picture statement (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,005; and(2) in the Columbia Gas and Electric Co. case (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. par. 17,010, in which divestment of a subsidiary is sought, and
civil process used because, the Department says, the subsidiary was ac-
quired eight years ago.
13. Medical Monopoly statement, supra, note 6; Motion Picture state-
ment, supra, note 5.
14. (1890) 26 Stat. 209, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 et seq.
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It will be charged that this practice may be used coer-
cively. The answer is that any criminal law may be used
coercively. The danger in the use of this power is in its
secret use and not where public statements giving the
grounds for action must be made. * * *
In outlining our procedure on the consent decree we have
furnished every safeguard that the procedure will not be
used either for unjustified coercion, or to hide a vacillating
prosecution policy, by providing first for a public statement
and second for submitting the proposal to the judge in
charge of the criminal proceeding. Offers made by defend-
ants in the hope that they may lead to a consent decree
neither imply that the case was improperly brought nor
that it is weak nor that the Government is anxious to drop
it. The sole test is that they confer important public benefits
related to restoring orderly competitive markets which go
beyond a promise to desist from the practices charged, and
beyond any results which could be obtained by a conviction.
It would be unfair and inaccurate to charge the Department of
Justice with intentionally employing coercive tactics. Concededly,
the Department is charged with the enforcement of laws as they
are written, and the laws vest in it the power to prosecute as
well as the power to discontinue prosecution. But, in a broad
sense, the powers thus conferred are potentially coercive. This
is the case where consent decrees offer greater relief than could
be obtained as a result of litigation, and the Department, there-
fore, announces a formulated policy of entertaining proposals
for them from actual or prospective defendants, declaring that
an acceptable consent decree will result in a nolle prosequi. Of
course, the term "coercive" is not necessarily condemnatory.
Strictly speaking, every legal action is coercive in that com-
pliance with law is demanded under pain of punishment or dam-
ages. The inquiry is, therefore, not to be satisfied by merely
concluding that the new anti-trust policy is "coercive." It must
ultimately be determined, if possible, whether standards of con-
duct based upon laws adopted through the normal legislative
processes are likely to be traded away to save the annoyance
and cost of defending a prosecution. The practice of indicting
individuals who are officers or directors of corporate defendants
involves something of a stigma even though, in the words of
the Department itself, "many types of antitrust violations are
in the nature of misdemeanors."15 The practice followed in the
15. Medical Monopoly statement, supra, note 6.
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long oil trial of requiring the principal indicted officers to attend
throughout the entire trial involves a certain amount of harass-
ment, particularly where, as in the automobile finance and oil
cases, the indictment is brought in a district located at a sub-
stantial distance from the main offices of the defendants. The
Department's practice of issuing official statements16 is in itself
cause for apprehension as being prejudicial to the prospective
defendants in the area from which the petit jury must be drawn.
In such circumstances the prospect of submitting to the deter-
mination of a jury of twelve laymen complicated issues relating
to the practices and methods of a huge industry is far from
inviting, particularly under the restrictions of criminal pro-
cedure.
Accordingly, the situation of a prospective corporate defen-
dant whose management feels itself unjustly accused involves
a Hobson's choice between "millions for defense but not one cent
for tribute" and a consideration of how far restrictions can be
imposed upon its business activities by a consent decree without
too great a penalty upon future operations.
Stated in another way, the aim of every business is to acquire
"its share" of the available market. The Department may feel
that the desired share is monopoly; the concern contends that
its share is as much as it can capture by virtue of services,
facilities, products, or values, which are superior to those of
competitors. The consent decree does not ordinarily circum-
scribe the amount of the defendant's share of the market, but
rather the methods by which it obtains any share.
The problem of the defendant is, therefore, whether it can
successfully compete even though it foregoes certain methods
of competition. It must be borne in mind that the prospective
defendant need not have used or threatened to use certain of
the prohibited methods. Likewise, there may be legitimate
doubts-at least sincere disagreement between the Department
and the defendant--as to whether certain or all of the methods
to be prohibited are illegal under the Sherman Act. The question
is whether surrender of freedom to use the methods to be pro-
hibited by the consent decree is too high a price to pay for settle-
16. The propriety of the Department's statements is the subject of
correspondence between a Special Committee of the St. Louis Bar Associa-
tion and Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold referred to in (1939)
25 A. B. A. J. 358-359.
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ment of the controversy, particularly since a final judgment or
decree in either a criminal prosecution or an equity proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States, to the effect that
a defendant has violated the anti-trust laws, is prima facie
evidence against the defendant in a treble-damage action, 7
except where there is a consent judgment or decree entered be-
fore any testimony has been taken.1 8
With the foregoing in mind, it may be interesting to examine
the first consent decrees"s entered after the Attorney General's
statement of policy of May 18, 1938.
These consent decrees terminated proceedings under two of
three indictments, all returned at South Bend, Indiana, on May
27, 1938. Both indictments were nol-prossed immediately upon
entry of the consent decrees on Nov. 15, 1938. One other pro-
ceeding, United States v. General Motors Corp., is still pending
and it will be the purpose of the following comments to avoid
any discussion of the merits of this controversy which is still
sub judice.19a
NATURE OF THE INDUSTRY
In the automobile industry, it is not the general practice of
the manufacturer to ship cars to dealers. on consignment or
open credit. Unless a dealer pays for the cars in cash (which
he may, do out of his own funds or out of funds borrowed on a
secured or unsecured basis), payment for the cars is made by
a finance company which acquires title from the manufacturer
and arranges for the delivery of the cars to the dealer under
a title retention or lien instrument, usually a trust receipt.20
Under the provisions of the instrument, whether trust receipt,
conditional sale contract, chattel mortgage, or consignment re-
ceipt, the dealer agrees to pay the finance company the amount
17. (1914) 38 Stat. 731, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. secs. 15, 16.
18. (1914) 38 Stat. 731, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 16.
19. United States v. Ford Motor Co. and Universal Credit Corp. (D.
C. N. D. Ind. 1938); United States v. Chrysler Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ind.
1938).
19a. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled, United States v.
General Motors Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 353.
20. For an exposition of the mechanics of wholesale financing, see In ro
Bell (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 45 F. (2d) 19, cert. denied (1931) 293 U. S. 819; In
re James (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 555. See also Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act, which has been adopted in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. (1936
Supp.) 9 U. L. A. 208.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss4/1
THE AUTO-FINANCE CONSENT DECREE
advanced by the finance company,2' usually at a named date, and,
in any event, upon the sale of the car to a retail purchaser.
If the retail sale is on the installment plan, the dealer has an
obligation payable to the finance company and, instead of cash
with which to meet that obligation, has the purchaser's note
and conditional sale contract calling for payment in twelve or
more monthly installments. Some dealers have sufficient work-
ing capital to enable them to pay their obligations to the finance
company and at the same time retain and collect the purchaser's
installment obligation. In the majority of cases, however, the
dealer sells2 2 the retail obligation to a finance company, fre-
quently the one which advanced the money to the factory for
the car in question. Out of the proceeds he pays the finance
company the amount of its advance, the difference representing
his gross profit on the transaction and recoupment of sums paid
on account.
The time selling price of the car regularly exceeds the cash
selling price by an amount which has become known as the
finance charge.2 3 The finance charge covers the cost of making
21. Oil City Motor Co. v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp. (C. C. A. 10,
1935) 76 F. (2d) 589.
22. Cullum v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1933) 68 F.
(2d) 310; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Midwest Chevrolet Co.
(C. C. A. 10, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 1, (C. C. A. 10, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 386;
Eastern Acceptance Corp. v. Godfrey (1936) 14 N. J. Misc. 190, 183 Atl.
822; Lansdowne Finance Co. v. Prusky (1936) 120 Pa. Super. 555, 182
Atl. 794; Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 1197.
23. This difference may be more than the amount equivalent to legal
interest without constituting usury. Hogg v. Ruffner (U. S. 1861) 1 Black
115; In re Bibbey (D. C. D. Minn. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 944; Commercial Credit
Co. v. Tarwater (1926) 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39, 48 A. L. R. 1437; Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Parks (1927) 215 Ala. 648, 112 So. 237; Smith v.
Kaufman (1920) 145 Ark. 548, 224 S. W. 978; Standard Motors Finance
Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co. (1927) 173 Ark. 875, 293 S. W. 1026, 57 A. L. R.
877; Wilson v. French Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 188, 4 P. (2d) 537; Ricker v.
Fay Securities Co. (1931) 110 Cal. App. 750, 294 Pac. 732; Pacific Finance
Corp. v. Lauman (1928) 95 Cal. App. 541, 273 Pac. 48; Murphy v. Agen
(1928) 92 Cal. App. 468, 268 Pac. 480; Berger v. Lodge (1928) 90 Cal. App.
19, 265 Pac. 515; Daniels v. Fenton (1935) 97 Colo. 409, 50 P. (2d) 62;
Gilbert v. Hudgens (1933) 92 Colo. 571, 22 P. (2d) 858; Zazzaro v. Colonial
Acceptance Corp. (1933) 117 Conn. 251, 167 Atl. 734; Bridgeport L. A. W.
Corp. v. Levy (1928) 110 Conn. 255, 147 Atl. 841; Davidson v. Davis (1910)
59 Fla. 476, 52 So. 139, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102, 20 Ann. Cas. 1130; Napier
Co. v. Trawick (1927) 164 Ga. 781, 139 S. E. 552; Rushing v. Worsham
(1898) 102 Ga. 825, 30 S. E. 541; Talley v. Commercial Credit Co. (1929)
39 Ga. App. 297, 147 S. E. 175; Manufacturers Finance Trust v. Stone
(1929) 251 Ill. App. 414; Porter v. Stolkin (1936) 101 Ind. App. 705, 200
N. E. 74; Stevens v. Grossman (1935) 100 Ind. App. 417, 196 N. E. 123;
Newkirk v. Burson (1867) 28 Ind. 435; Gilmore & Smith v. Ferguson &
1939]
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credit investigations of prospective purchasers, the cost of mak-
ing collections, and credit losses. Sometimes the cost of insur-
ance on the car is stated separately; otherwise, it is included
in the finance charge.
Many finance companies operate on the so-called "recourse"
or "repurchase" plan. Under this plan, if the car is repossessed
by the finance company and returned to the dealer within a
limited period of time after default, the dealer repurchases the
car for the amount of the unpaid balance; if repossessed after
a specified period of time, the dealer pays only the appraised
value. As compensation to the dealer for assuming the risk
of loss in repairing and reselling the repossession, the dealer
receives a portion of the finance charge on all installment trans-
actions. For example, on a new car, if the finance charge is
$30 the dealer may receive from $7.50 to $10. This fund, fre-
quently called "loss reserves," operates upon the principle of
insurance, i. e., the expense and loss on any single repossession
will almost certainly be substantially higher than the reserves
on that particular transaction, but is made up out of the reserve
fund. Whether the fund is adequate or inadequate depends upon
whether sales are made to good, border-line, or poor risks, upon
fluctuations in business and economic conditions, upon transitory
catastrophes, and upon the ability of the particular dealer
to repair and resell the car advantageously.
Cassell (1868) 28 Iowa 220; Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland (1927) 124
Kan. 393, 260 Pac. 659; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain (La.
1937) 176 So. 636; Robbins v. Page and Sons (1929) 10 La. App. 207, 120
So. 683; Hartwick Lumber Co. v. Perlman (1928) 245 Mich. 3, 222 N. W.
147; Commercial Credit Co., Inc. v. Shelton (1925) 139 Miss. 132, 104 So.
75; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich (1924) 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S. W. 425; Holland-O'Neal Milling Co. v. Rawlings (1925) 217 Mo. App.
466, 268 S. W. 683; Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler (1933) 124 Nob.
514, 247 N. W. 429; Levine v. Nolan Motors, Inc. (Sup. Ct. 1938) 169
Misc. 1025, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 311; P. J. Tierney Sons, Inc. v. Bajowski
(1932) 258 N. Y. 563, 180 N. E. 333; Sayler v. Brady (1933) 63 N. D. 471,
248 N. W. 673; Mayer v. American Finance Corp. (1935) 172 Okla. 419,
45 P. (2d) 497; Mondie v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1936) 178
Okla. 584, 63 P. (2d) 708; Pierce v. Commercial Inv. Trust Corp. (1935)
170 Okla. 633, 41 P. (2d) 481; Graham v. Universal Credit Co. (Tex.
1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 727; Conway v. Skidmore (1935) 48 Wyo. 73, 41 P.
(2d) 1049. For an interesting series of articles on various legal problems
applicable to the finance industry, see Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in
Installment Sales" (1935) 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173; Cavers, The Con-
sumer's Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy (1935) 2 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 200; Adelson, The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale
(1935) 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 218; Myerson, Practical Aspects of Some
Legal Problems of Sales Finance Companies .(1935) 2 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 244.
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A large number of other finance companies operate on the
so-called "without recourse" plan, pursuant to which the dealer
has no responsibility in the case of the purchaser's default or
repossession of the car. Nevertheless, some of the "without
recourse" finance companies pay the dealer a portion of the
finance charge.
NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The foundation of each of the three indictments is a charge
made to the Department of Justice that each of the manufac-
turers conspired to require dealers of the particular manufac-
turer to sell their retail paper to the favored finance company.
This requirement was enforced through the alleged use of vari-
ous discriminatory and coercive practices and the payment of
loss reserves. Although each indictment is so framed as to refer
throughout to an alleged restraint on interstate trade and com-
merce in automobiles, it is clearly apparent, on analysis, that
the real complaint is an alleged restraint of trade in installment
paper, which is the profitable end of the finance industry-
wholesale financing being handled more as a convenience to deal-
ers and at rates which allow little profit. While this article will
not analyze the point, it will be noted, of course, that there are
interesting problems of federal jurisdiction involved. 24
24. See Hemphill v. Orloff (1928) 277 U. S. 537; Blumenstock Bros.
Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1920) 252 U. S. 436; Hall v.
Geiger-Jones (1917) 242 U. S. 539; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County (1913) 231 U. S. 495; Paul v. Virginia (U. S. 1869) 8 Wall. 168;
Nathan v. Louisiana (U. S. 1850) 8 How. 73. The writer has found no
case in which the Supreme Court has passed squarely on the question of
whether stocks and bonds are objects of interstate commerce, the point
being specifically left open in Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1917) 242 U. S. 539.
In Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm. (1935) 298 U. S. 1, the
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to pass on the constitutionality of the
Federal Securities Act of 1983, 48 Stat. 74, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A.
see. 77 (a - nun). Both the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, (1938 Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78
(a-jj), seem to be predicated on Champion v. Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 321,
which sustained the power of Congress to exclude lottery tickets from trans-
portation in interstate commerce or through the mails, a somewhat different
principle. The retail sale of practically all automobiles and the retail pur-.
chase of practically all installment paper is interstate within the meaning
of A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495.
The theory of the Department is evidently based upon the doctrine of
"burden of interstate commerce" as indicated by the reasoning in N. L. R. B.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) 301 U. S. 1; N. L. R. B. v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co. (1937) 301 U. S. 49; N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co. (1937) 301 U. S. 58; Washington, V., & M. Coach Co.
v. N. L. R. B. (1937) 301 U. S. 142. See also Furst v. Brewster (1931)
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ANAYLSIS OF INDICTMENT AGAINST FORD MOTOR CO.25
Jurisdictional Aflegations.2  The indictment alleges the vol-
ume of business done by the three large automobile manufac-
turers (although only one manufacturer was indicted in each
case) and the proportion of the whole done by them; the states
wherein they conduct manufacturing operations; the number of
dealers; the transportation of cars from the place of manufac-
ture to the dealers; the requirement that cars be paid for prior
to the shipment from the factory and the amount involved; the
need for wholesale financing; the making of contracts between
dealers and different financing companies for wholesale financ-
ing; the transfer of title to the defendant finance companies
before shipment; the existence of some 375 other finance com-
panies; the refusal of the manufacturers to transfer title to
such other finance companies and the transfer of title to them
by the dealers; the mechanics and volume of retail financing;
the need for, and volume of, retail financing; the need for retail
financing for used automobiles traded in on the sale of a new
automobile.
Gravamen. The charge is not that the defendants restrained
either wholesale or retail financing of automobiles, as the De-
partment evidently was troubled by the matter of federal juris-
diction.27 Instead, the indictment alleges that the defendants
282 U. S. 493; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant (1921) 257 U. S.
282.
25. In each indictment against a particular manufacturer and a particu-
lar finance company, allegations are made throughout relating to the
practices of the other two manufacturers and their particular finance com-
panies. The three indictments are substantially identical. The principal
differences are that in the General Motors indictment reliance is placed
upon the ownership by General Motors Corporation of its finance company
subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. In the Chrysler in-
dictment it is alleged that, as part of the conspiracy, Chrysler Corporation
and Commercial Credit Company entered into contracts in which it was
agreed that Chrysler Corporation should bring about the use by Chrysler
dealers of the financing plans of Commercial Credit Company in return for
which the latter agreed to sell to Chrysler Corporation a large number of
shares of common stock of Commercial Credit Company, and to pay to
Chrysler Corporation a substantial part of the consolidated net profits of
Commercial Credit Company for each calendar year. In the Ford indict-
ment it is alleged that as part of the conspiracy it was agreed that Com-
mercial Investment Trust Incorporated, a finance company affiliated through
common ownership with Universal Credit Corporation, would refrain from
competing with Universal Credit Corporation for the business of Ford
dealers.
26. Pars. 1-28.
27. Cf. note 24, supra.
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"unlawfully have engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of the
aforesaid trade and commerce among the several States in Ford
automobiles. 12 8 It continues:
It has been a purpose of the defendants and an object
of said conspiracy to procure, monopolize and keep within
their control to the greatest extent possible, and to the ex-
clusion of all other persons and corporations, the business
of financing the trade and commerce in Ford automobiles,
and in used automobiles of any make sold and handled by
Ford dealers. 29
Means of Accomplishing the Restraint.30 The indictment al-
leges that the defendants (the manufacturer, the finance com-
pany, and certain individual directors, officers and employees of
each) arranged and agreed among themselves: to require deal-
ers, as a condition of selling them new cars, to agree to patronize
the designated finance company and no other; to make dealer
franchises run for a term of one year, providing cancellation
at will as a penalty for failing to patronize the designated
finance company; to refuse to furnish, transport, and deliver
automobiles to dealers who refuse to patronize the designated
finance company, or who patronize other finance companies; to
inspect the dealer's records for the purpose of detecting patron-
age of other finance companies; to coerce dealers to permit such
inspection of their records; to compel dealers to disclose the
information; to procure such information from dealers' em-
ployees and to require dealers to explain and justify their pat-
ronage of other finance companies; to compel dealers to refrain
from patronizing other finance companies by other means not
known to the Grand Jury.
It was further alleged that the defendants agreed among
themselves: to grant favors to dealers patronizing the desig-
nated finance company and to refuse such favors to dealers
patronizing other finance companies; to delay shipments to
dealers patronizing other finance companies; and to discrimi-
nate between dealers as to the kind, model, time of shipment,
and time and manner of payments based on their patronage
of the particular finance company or other finance companies;
28. Par. 34 bf the General Motors, and par. 33 of the Chrysler, indict-
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to give office space in the factory, information, title documents,
and title to the designated finance company and refuse it to
others; to enforce discriminatory, onerous, and unreasonable
requirements relative to the manner, form, and time of payment
for automobiles; to advertise and recommend the designated
finance company, and require dealers to do so, and to refrain
from advertising or recommending others; to fix the finance
charge of the designated finance company and to pay the dealer
a portion thereof for diverting the financing of retail sales to
the designated company; and to represent to purchasers that
the dealer received no part of the finance charge-the effect
of which was to require other finance companies to engage in
the same practice of paying dealers a portion of the finance
charge, the total of such payments to dealers being set forth.
The indictment then alleges that the dealers have substantial
investments in their businesses which would have been destroyed
if dealers had not submitted to the requirements of the defen-
dants and concludes that the defendants "unlawfully have en-
gaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among
the several states in Ford automobiles."81
CONSENT DEGREES
The consent decrees are framed upon principles designed to:
prohibit coercive and discriminatory practices; permit the con-
duct of business without undue restrictions; benefit the public
in matters not covered by the Sherman Act; leave disputed
economic questions, involving the competitive position of a de-
fendant, to future determination in a trial de novo, if subsequent
events should make this appropriate; protect the defendants
against unfair competition from competitors who are not simi-
larly restrained; allow for compliance with state laws; permit
a review of the situation after four years, unhampered by the
restrictions of Swift & Co. v. United States.32
A. Restrictions on Manufacturer
In the nature of things, the majority of the restrictions oper-
ate upon the manufacturer, and fall into various classes.
Flat Restrictions. The manufacturer is required to permit
any finance company or other person to pay for any automobile
31. Par. 72.
32. (1932) 286 U. S. 106.
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delivered by the manufacturer to any dealer, upon written
specific or continuing authority of the dealer.33 Under this pro-
vision the manufacturer is not permitted to insist that the
dealer give his own check in payment for cars or to restrict
the dealer's freedom in selecting such person as he desires to
advance the cost of the car. On the other hand, in order to pro-
tect the franchise relationship, as well as to prevent mere volun-
teer payments, the dealer, if he is not to pay for cars himself,
must give the factory either a specific authorization to accept
payment from someone else for a particular shipment or a con-
tinuing authorization which may run for a period of time.
The manufacturer is forbidden to make, or continue, a con-
tract with a dealer which requires the dealer to patronize a
particular finance company, or group of finance companies, or
which requires the dealers to observe any plan for, or rate of,
financing designated by the manufacturer.' The manufacturer
is forbidden to cancel or terminate a dealer's franchise or
threaten to do so because of his failure to patronize any partic-
ular finance company or any class of finance companies.3 5
The manufacturer is forbidden to obtain from any finance
company any payment as a bonus or commission on account of
retail financing done by that finance company, and is forbidden
to make any loan to any finance company or purchase its securi-
ties except for purchases of notes, bonds, commercial paper,
or other evidences of indebtedness in the open market.3 6
Finally, the manufacturer is forbidden to recommend, en-
dorse, or advertise any particular finance company to any dealer
or to the public.3? The manufacturer is nevertheless free to
adopt, advertise, and recommend to the public and to its dealers
plans of financing retail sales of new automobiles.
At this point, however, there is a major divergence between
the two decrees.38 Under the Ford decree, the manufacturer
33. Final Decree, United States v. Ford Motor Co. (D. C. N. D. Ind.
1988), and United States v. Chrysler Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1938), contain
eorresponding paragraphs, the contents of which are similar. Hereinafter
both will be cited as "decree." Decree, par. 6(a).
34. Decree, par. 6(g).
35. Decree, par. 6(h).
36. Decree, par. 12.
37. Decree, par. 6(k).
88. Compare decree, par. 6(k), with clause D of Finance Company
Registration statement, reading as follows:
"Until the effective date of any withdrawal of this statement by the
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is permitted to adopt plans for financing retail sales of new
automobiles manufactured by Ford and to recommend the use
of such plans to dealers and the public. It is not, however, per-
mitted to name any single finance company, or group of finance
companies, in its advertising. Chrysler Corporation, on the con-
trary, while also permitted to adopt plans for financing retail
sales of new automobiles manufactured by Chrysler, is per-
mitted, but not required, to include in its advertising the names
of those finance companies which are registered9 finance com-
panies. However, if any registered finance company is named
in the advertising, the manufacturer is obligated to include the
names of all registered finance companies in the territory to
which the advertising is directed, who agree to offer the
"Chrysler Plan," and no other plan, for financing retail sales
of new Chrysler cars. The finance charges included in the install-
ment paper to be acquired by registered finance companies pur-
suant to the "Chrysler Plan" may be lower than the finance
charges specified in the "Chrysler Plan" and the other terms
of the paper may be more favorable to the retail purchaser. If,
on the contrary, the finance charge is higher than that specified
in the "Chrysler Plan," the registered finance company may not
purchase it unless it promptly credits the excess on the pur-
chaser's obligation.
finance company in the manner provided by paragraph 1 of subparagraph(k), or in any manner provided by paragraph 5 or by paragraph 6, of
sub-paragraph (j), of paragraph 6 of said decree, all retail time sales
paper, created after the effective date of any plan or plans or modification
thereof and covering new automobiles made by the Manufacturer, acquired
by the finance company by the Manufacturer's dealers (whether located in
the area described in Clause (C) hereof or elsewhere), shall be acquired
by it in accordance with the terms of any plan or plans of financing adopted
by the Manufacturer as provided by sub-paragraph (j) and then in effect
provided:
a. The finance charges included in such retail paper may be less than
the finance charges specified by such plan or plans or modification thereof,
and the other terms of such paper may be more favorable to the retail
purchaser than the terms so specified; and b. the finance company may
acquire retail time sales paper covering new automobiles made by the
Manufacturer in which the retail purchaser of the automobile is required
to pay a finance charge in excess of the finance charge specified in the
plan so adopted or modification thereof, but only if the finance company
shall promptly credit such retail purchaser on the time purchase price of
the automobile with the amount of the excess. The words 'finance charge'
as used in this statement shall mean the difference between the cash de-
livered price of an automobile and the price of that automobile when sold
on an installment payment plan, including or not including (as the plan
may provide) insurance for the retail purchaser."
39. See p. 547, infra.
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The Department, in its statement issued November 7, 1938,40
hails these provisions as great advances in the field, and states
that, "There are no precedents which compel the adoption of
such restrictions on advertising." It believes that uneconomic
results follow from the advertising of particular trade names,
stating:
In the oil industry, to take one example, refiners are de-
prived of their market because of the belief induced by
great expenditure that good gasoline is sold only under
particular trade names. * * * Such a method of advertising
has never been held to be violative of the anti-trust laws, and
the legality of its use, in the absence of positive fraud, has
not been questioned.41
The importance of lending the trade name of the manufacturer
to a finance plan may be very great. Competition in the sale of
cars from year to year depends upon features which have pub-
lic appeal. One year it may be four-wheel brakes, another year
it may be steel bodies, another year it may be finance plans
available to the installment purchaser. One manufacturer may
make a successful appeal to the public based upon the imprimatur
of his trade name as a guarantee that the finance plan serves
the best interest of the purchaser, so that the purchaser has as
much confidence in the finance plan as he has in the motor or
body carrying the same trade name. Consequently, other manu-
facturers must make equally good finance plans available to
purchasers of their cars and must certify to the soundness of
the plan by their sponsorship.
The decree sets no limits upon the contents of the "plan."
Primarily, the manufacturer will be interested in the amount
of the finance charge; indeed, the amount of the finance charge
may be the sole element of importance to the manufacturer.
However, the ingenuity of business men may in the future de-
velop other features of a finance plan which may be of as great
importance to the manufacturer as the amount of the finance
charge. Conceivably, even the relationship between the finance
company and the dealer may be of importance to the manu-
facturer in developing sales of his product. The decree sets no
limits which would confine the industry in a straight-jacket by
defining "plan" in terms of the elements which now are thought
40. (1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 17,011.
41. Id., at par. 17,011, 4(b).
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to be of importance. The manufacturer is free to adopt and rec-
ommend any plan, subject only to two limitations: the manu-
facturer may not enter into any contract with the dealer which
requires the dealer to observe any plan recommended by the
manufacturer;42 and any aggrieved finance company or other
aggrieved person, upon filing proper bond may apply to the
court to vacate a plan on the ground that it constitutes an un-
reasonable restraint of trade or commerce in automobiles under
the Sherman Act.43
Experience will determine whether the manufacturers were
wise in adopting any limitations upon their freedom to adver-
tise and recommend the services of particular finance companies.
The Department of Justice's statement declares that the adver-
tising is to be used "for the purpose of increasing consumption
without giving any advantage to particular competing com-
panies whose services are equivalent." The Department has as-
sumed that such services are equivalent (just as it assumes in
its statements that all brands of gasoline are equivalent) and, by
the rules of conduct for registered finance companies," has ap-
proved a number of rules through which it believes such equiva-
lence can be assured. However, in the nature of things, various
subjective elements are not governed by these objective rules.
For example, suppose Finance Company A and Finance Company
B use the same finance charge, arrange for identical insurance,
and make exactly the same charge for extending a past-due in-
stallment. Assume further that Finance Company A is lenient in
granting extensions and has facilities for disposing of repos-
sessed cars at the smallest possible loss, whereas Finance Com-
pany B is very hard-boiled about granting extensions to pur-
chasers who justifiably require indulgence, and does not have
the facilities for disposing of repossessions to good advantage.
The services of these two finance companies are not equivalent
from the standpoint of the manufacturer and the good will of
the manufacturer's customers. Yet by these decrees the manu-
facturers are not permitted to say to their purchasers and deal-
ers: "We recommend Finance Company A rather than Finance
Company B, although both of them offer our 'official plan'."
42. Decree, par. 6(g).
43. Decree, par. 6(k), subsec. 3. Cf. (1914) 38 Stat. 737, (1927) 15 U. S.
C. sec. 26.
44. See p. 547, infra.
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These provisions of the decree constitute the recognition from
the standpoint of the Department (or the adoption, from the
standpoint of the manufacturer) of the premise that after
title has passed from the manufacturer it does not have power
to control the finance charge or the method of retail financing
or the selection of the financing agency. It may be difficult in
the future to demonstrate the effect of these provisions, but it
is to be hoped that the Department and the court will be sensi-
tive to a realization of the problem. 45
Prohibitions Qualified by Purpose. There are four restric-
tions placed upon the manufacturer which are qualified by the
provision that the manufacturer may not perform an act with
a specified purpose. As to this, the decree provides46 that the
burden of proof is upon the respondent to prove that the act
complained of as a violation of the decree was done for a pur-
pose not forbidden.
In the first place, the manufacturer is forbidden to establish
any practice, procedure, or plan for the retail or wholesale
financing of automobiles for the purpose of enabling any partic-
ular finance company or finance companies to enjoy a competi-
tive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers through
any service, facility, or privilege extended by the manufacturer,
45. From the standpoint of the parties, much the same issue is involved
as in a number of other matters in which the manufacturers have sought
to control their dealers on subjects in which the good will of the manu-
facturer was involved. See, e. g., International Business Machines Corp.
v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 131, 140; Pick Manufacturing Co. v.
General Motors Corp. (C. C. A. 7, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 641, aff'd (1935)
299 U. S. 3; Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp. (C. C. A. 6,
1986) 83 F. (2d) 764. A related principle is involved in the price resale
statutes. Cf. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distiller's Corp.(1936) 299 U. S. 183, 195. Note, however, that as distinguished from the
standard price-fixing cases, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 373; Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-
Distiller's Corp., supra; the automobile manufacturer was not attempting
to fix or maintain a minimum resale price; its interest being in controlling
a maximum time selling price in the belief that, if its dealers have too high
a time selling price by reason of not making available to the public the
lowest finance charge which is available to the dealer, the manufacturer's
good will will be impaired and the public will tend to purchase cars of
competing manufacturers whose dealers make available lower finance
charges and therefore have lower time selling prices. It is common knowl-
edge that the cash prices of competing cars of the same general class are
highly competitive. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Boone (C. C. A. 9, 1917)
244 Fed. 335, in which resale price contracts on patented articles were
sustained where the patented article was only one of several competing
products.
46. Decree, par. 10.
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if the same service, facility, or privilege, or one corresponding
thereto, is not made available to any other finance company upon
its written request and upon substantially similar terms and
conditions. 7
Under this provision, arbitrary specifications for the purpose
of benefiting a particular finance company or group of finance
companies would not be allowed. On the other hand, the decree
clearly sanctions financing plans which are established for other
purposes, such as to benefit the manufacturer qua manufac-
turer, the dealers or the public. If established for such pur-
poses or any other purpose not forbidden, the unwillingness
or inability of a particular finance company to meet the speci-
fications is of no consequence. Even if no purpose other than
the forbidden purpose could be shown, there would be no viola-
tion of the decree if the plan were open to all finance companies;
but if, for example, a plan were made available only to finance
companies having some arbitrarily selected characteristic so that
the ostensible characteristic really amounted to a specification of
one particular company, and if no purpose other than the for-
bidden purpose could be shown, a violation of the decree would
be present. It is apparent, therefore, that no legitimate interest
of the manufacturer is restricted by this provision.
In the second place, the manufacturer is forbidden to give,
make available, deny, or threaten to deny, to any dealer any ser-
vice or facility, or otherwise to discriminate among its dealers,
for the purpose of influencing a dealer to patronize a particular
finance company or class of finance companies. 8
In the third place, the manufacturer is forbidden to arrange
or agree with any finance company that an agent of the manu-
facturer and an agent of the finance company shall together be
present with any dealer or prospective dealer for the purpose
of influencing the dealer to patronize that finance company.4
There is a corresponding provision applicable to the respondent
finance company named in the decree. 0 The restriction does not
apply to joint visits for the purpose of arranging some special
service or facility for the dealer, going beyond mere retail or
wholesale financing in the ordinary course of business, even
47. Decree, par. 6(e).
48. Decree, par. 6(f).
49. Decree, par. 6(i).
50. Decree, par. 7(d).
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though the result might be to influence the dealer to patronize
the finance company or even to contract to do so. Examples of
such services or facilities would be the making of capital loans,
arranging a plan to liquidate the dealer's past due or frozen
debts, or arranging to extend financing facilities in an amount
clearly and substantially beyond that justified by the dealer's
financial condition.
There is, however, a significant distinction in the two pro-
visions. The manufacturer is forbidden to arrange or agree that
such joint visit shall be made "except in each instance upon the
written request of the dealer or prospective dealer"; whereas
the respondent finance company is forbidden to arrange or agree
that such joint visit shall be made except upon the written
request of the dealer or prospective dealer, with the phrase "in
each instance" omitted. In other words, it was recognized by
the draughtsman of the decree that there might be many occa-
sions for such joint visits which might have the incidental effect
of influencing the dealer to patronize the particular finance com-
pany. It was further recognized that there could be no coercive
effect in such joint visits if the dealer requested them. However,
if the manufacturer could insert a "blanket request" in its
dealer franchises, it could thus inferentially compel the dealer
to make such requests; this is not allowed. On the other hand,
the finance company has no such power and therefore "blanket
requests" obtained by the finance company are permitted.
Finally, the manufacturer is forbidden to use any informa-
tion obtained from the dealer, or his employees, or to require
disclosure of any information for the purpose of influencing
the dealer to patronize any particular finance company or com-
panies.51 No restriction is placed upon the manufacturer in
obtaining any information which it desires from dealers; the
restriction is only upon the use for a forbidden purpose and
upon requiring disclosure for the forbidden purpose. Here, too,
recognition is given to the fact that no coercive effect can result
where the dealer requests the disclosure or use of the informa-
tion, or where the dealer requests the manufacturer to assist the
dealer in obtaining wholesale or retail financing, or special facil-
ities or services from a particular finance company which the
dealer designates. In the latter case, although the dealer's re-
51. Decree, par. 6(1).
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quest covers obtaining the facilities rather than disclosure of
the information, disclosure of the information may become
necessary and is not restricted.
Prohibitions against Discrimination. There are five provisions
to the effect that so long as the manufacturer continues to do
specified things for one finance company, it shall not refuse to
do the same or a corresponding thing for other finance com-
panies upon substantially similar terms and conditions, and
upon written request of the other finance companies. These are:
First, giving documents of title.52 Second, furnishing space for
maintaining an office in any place of business of the manufac-
turer.5 3 The decree, however, provides that the manufacturer
is permitted, if it so elects, to furnish space only to registered
finance companies." Third, knowingly furnishing the identity
of dealers or prospective dealers or other information concern-
ing them. 5 However, the manufacturer is permitted, if it so
elects, to furnish information only to registered finance com-
panies or to a finance company designated by a dealer or pros-
pective dealer. So far as the latter is concerned, this means that
if a prospective dealer notified the manufacturer to have the
X Finance Company get in touch with him, the manufacturer
is free to do so without notifying all other finance companies as
to the identity of this prospective dealer. Similarly, if a dealer
or prospective dealer notifies the manufacturer to give financial
information, or data respecting shipments of cars to him, only
to the X Finance Company, the manufacturer is not required
to give it to all other finance companies. Fourth, affording any
other service, facility, or privilege to one finance company and
refusing similar or corresponding services, facilities, or privi-
leges to other finance companies upon substantially similar
terms and conditions and upon written request.56 There are
similar provisions conferring the right to limit these to regis-
tered finance companies and finance companies designated by
the dealer or prospective dealer. Also, as noted above, this dis-
crimination is forbidden only if it is for the purpose of giving
a particular finance company a competitive advantage in obtain-
52. Decree, par. 6(b).
53. Decree, par. 6(c).
54. See infra, p. 547.
55. Decree, par. 6(d).
56. Decree, par. 6(e), subdiv. (ii); see also par. 12.
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ing the patronage of a dealer. Fifth, paying money to one finance
company with the purpose or effect of inducing or enabling it
to offer dealers a lower finance charge. In such case, the manu-
facturer must make payment upon substantially similar basis,
terms, and conditions, to every other finance company offering
such lower finance charges. 57
Provisions Facilitating the Conduct of Business. There are
a number of provisions designed to facilitate the conduct of
business either by way of limiting certain prohibitions or by
way of affirmative provisions.
Provisions are made for honoring requests from dealers. This
has already been noted with regard to the furnishing of infor-
mation, joint visits, services, facilities and privileges, and dis-
closure or use of information at the dealer's request or in con-
nection with obtaining facilities which he has requested.
The manufacturer is not required to do the identical act for
several finance companies but only to perform similar or cor-
responding acts.
Except as to the identity of dealers or prospective dealers,
the request of a finance company for information or for a ser-
vice, facility, or privilege from the manufacturer must be a
specific written request.58 A blanket request, such as "Please
give us all services, facilities, and privileges which you give
to any other finance company," or "Please give us all informa-
tion about dealers which you give to any other finance company,"
is not valid.
Finance companies are frequently required to furnish special
facilities or services which go beyond retail or wholesale financ-
ing in the regular course of business. Instances of these are
the making of capital loans to dealers, or the granting of ex-
tensions of time within which to liquidate the dealer's past due
or frozen obligations, usually with arrangements for periodical
amortization. Extraordinary amounts of financing, in connec-
tion with transactions not in the ordinary course of business, or
beyond the dealer's financial worth, are also sometimes required.
In connection with these matters and other similar matters, it
is frequently necessary for the finance company to consult jointly
with the dealer and the manufacturer, and the decree makes
57. Decree, par. 12.
58. Decree, par. 6(d-e).
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express provision"s for such consultations even though the effect
of such consultations may be to influence the dealer to patronize
the particular finance company involved.
Attention was called 0 to the provisions relating to recom-
mending, endorsing, or advertising a particular finance company,
and to the fact that a manufacturer might desire to do so in
order to preserve its own good will and to develop the sales of
its product, and not to aid the particular finance company. The
decrees allow the manufacturer,"' in connection with developing
plans for financing the retail sale of new automobiles, to obtain
assurances from one or more finance companies, either before
or after adoption of any plan, that such finance company or
companies will make the plan available for at least a specified
period of time.
Two provisions of the decree present the fundamental con-
flict between the viewpoint of the manufacturer and that of the
Department.02 One manufacturer, while claiming the right to
do so, had never gone so far as to make contracts with its dealers
requiring them to use finance charges not higher than those ap-
proved by the factory. Another manufacturer06 had included
in its current dealer contracts a provision that the dealer would
not make finance charges to purchasers in excess of the rates
then available under any plan that the manufacturer may have
provided or recommended, if the terms of the plan were reason-
ably available to the dealer. The making or continuance of such
contracts is now forbidden to the manufacturer.04 The manu-
facturer's power to protect its good will against over-charges
by dealers is therefore restricted to the power of advertising
and recommending equitable rates, and, under the Chrysler
decree, to naming all registered companies which offer the plan.
The theory of the decree is that, if the manufacturer advertises
such rates with sufficient vigor and if it arranges with one or
more finance companies to make such rates available, the public
will demand them and the dealers will supply them in response.
There can be no safe prediction as to the efficacy of such appeals
59. Decree, pars. 6(i), 7(d).
60. Supra, p. 537 et seq.
61. Decree, par. 6 (k).
62. Decree, pars. 6 (g), 6 (k).
63. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment in Chrysler Corporation v.
Cummings (D. C. D. Colo. 1938) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 15,022.
64. Decree, par. 6(g).
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to the public and to dealers. Experience alone will tell whether
the Department has injured the public by insisting that the
manufacturer may not require its dealers to patronize low-rate
finance companies, and may not recommend particular low-rate
companies.
B. Voluntary "Codes of Good Conduct" for Finance Companies
A benefit to high-rate finance companies as one segment of the
public has just been referred to, namely, removal from the area
of competition between finance companies of any restrictions
imposed by the manufacturer upon dealers in favor of low-rate
finance companies. The manufacturer is permitted to limit
certain privileges to registered finance companies, but may not
discriminate between dealers. There are, however, a number of
other finance company practices which affect the good will of
the factory. As to these, a novel technique was evolved, remi-
niscent of the N. R. A. Codes.6 5 An informal finance company
code is set up under which finance companies may voluntarily
register, and, pursuant to which, registered finance companies
may, at the election of the factory, be the sole recipients of
office space, information, and other privileges,6 and, in case
of Chrysler, of advertising.
The finance company is required to file a sworn statement
with the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana and to serve a copy, certified by the clerk, on the
manufacturer. rn its statement the finance company designates
the area in which it operates, 67 and agrees, on behalf of itself
and all of its affiliates,68 to observe a set of rules in doing busi-
ness with the manufacturer's dealers, wherever located. These
rules contain the following provisions :69
If the finance plan includes insurance to be arranged for by
the finance company, it shall arrange for such insurance, unless
the insurance company to which the risk is submitted declines
to write the risk. The finance company contact is with the
dealer until after it has acquired the paper, and therefore it must
rely on the dealer's representations as to the kind of insurance
65. Decree, par. 6(j).
66. Decree, par. 6 (c, d, e); also par. 6(k) of the Chrysler decree.
67. Decree, par. 6(j), subdiv. 4(C).
68. Ford decree, par. 6(j), subdiv. 4(D); Chrysler decree, par. 6(j)
sudiv. 4(E).
69. Decree, par. 6(j), subdiv. 4(B).
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which is involved. However, if the dealer represents that, for
example, $50 deductible collision insurance is to be arranged,
the finance company will not be permitted to arrange $100 de-
ductible collision insurance and profit by the saving in premium.
It must promptly send a certificate or copy of the policy to the
purchaser, reciting the character of the coverage and the amount
of the premium.
The finance company will not require or accept wage assign-
ments, or garnish wages or salaries, to collect deficiency judg-
ments on automobiles sold for less than $1000, which were for
private and non-commercial use and voluntarily returned to the
finance company at its request. The theory is that the small
wage-earner who purchases a low-price car and voluntarily
returns it after default should not have his wages garnished to
pay a deficiency judgment established by the resale of the car.
No such indulgence is justified in the case of the purchaser of
a high-priced car, or one who conceals the car after default, or
who forces the finance company to go to the expense of locating
and replevying the car.
Where the purchaser of an automobile sold for private or non-
commercial use has paid at least 50 per cent of his note or
other obligation, the finance company will not take a deficiency
judgment after repossession and resale of the car but will either
look to the car, or to the purchaser's personal responsibility with-
out repossession. In no event is the finance company permitted,
through such means as rigged foreclosures, to collect any amount
in excess of its actual losses and expenses, or to forfeit the
purchaser's equity.
Obviously, the finance company is not to evade these restric-
tions by passing the paper on to a successor holder. Further-
more, extension charges, reinstatement fees, and expenses of
collection or repossession are limited.
The finance company may not require the dealer to take, or
accept an assignment from the dealer of, chattel mortgages or
other liens on property other than the automobile purchased,
as additional security on private, non-commercial transactions.
The finance company is not permitted to represent that it is
connected or affiliated with the manufacturer, or has been en-
dorsed, recommended, or approved by it. However, a registered
finance company is permitted to state that fact; and a registered
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finance company, offering a plan adopted by the manufacturer,
is likewise permitted so to state, thus implementing, to a limited
extent, the manufacturer's advertising of a plan which it
approves.
The finance company agrees that it will not intentionally in-
jure the manufacturer's good will, or the reputation of its
product, or the good will of its dealers, except in so far as this
may inferentially result from asserting its legal or contractual
rights. The finance company also agrees not to disclose informa-
tion received from a manufacturer to a competitor of the manu-
facturer.
The finance company agrees to disclose to the purchaser what-
ever information on the subject of reserves is required by a
supplemental decree of the court on this subject.70 It also agrees
to comply in all other respects with the provisions of such sup-
plemental decree, if any should be hereafter entered.
The finance company agrees not to violate any other reason-
able rule made a part of the Code by the manufacturer, and
approved by the Department of Justice and the Court, after
notice and hearing.
In the Chrysler decree, there is an additional clause 71 pur-
suant to which a registered finance company cannot buy paper
covering new Chrysler cars at a higher finance charge than
specified in any plan adopted by Chrysler. If the paper con-
tains a higher charge, the finance company must refund the
excess to the purchaser by crediting it upon his obligation. This
is an attempt to control overcharges. The obvious weakness is
that no finance company is compelled to register, and no dealer
can be compelled to use a registered finance company.
Provision is made for withdrawal from registration and also
for removal of registered finance companies. The latter is ac-
complished through a petition filed by either the Government,
the manufacturer, or another registered finance company, apply-
ing to the court for an order that a particular finance company
shall cease to be a registered company because it has failed to
comply with the Code. After hearing, the court may enter such
orders as justice may require. The order may provide for sus-
70. Decree, par. 8.
71. Decree, par. 6(j), subdiv. 4(D). There is no corresponding provision
in the Ford decree.
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pension for a limited period of time, or for an indefinite suspen-
sion, in which case the finance company may apply for rein-
statement after the expiration of at least six months.
It is apparent that there are really two agencies operating
to "police" the Code: the public (which may complain either to
the Department or to the manufacturer), and competitors who
may learn of violations. The only penalty for violation, to be
sure, is the loss of privileges. Consequently, the efficacy of the
Code will, in substantial measure, depend upon the extent to
which the manufacturer decides to make privileges available
only to registered finance companies.
C. Restrictions on Respondent Finance Company
As indicated above,72 most of the prohibitions in the decree
are directed to the manufacturer and restrain its actions with
regard to any particular finance company or group of finance
companies. However, certain restrictions are applicable ex-
plicitly to the respondent finance company.
It is forbidden to represent to a dealer that the manufacturer
requires him to patronize respondent finance company, or that
his failure to do so will result in the cancellation or termination
of his franchise or in the loss of any advantage, service, or
facility furnished by the manufacturer, or that respondent
finance company can obtain any facility, service, or privilege
from the manufacturer which is not available to other finance
companies under the provisions of the decree. 73
Until entry of any further order by the court in the contingent
supplemental proceedings7' on the subject of reserves, it is
directed to pay to each dealer, subject to offsets, the amount
of all loss reserves standing to the credit of the dealer. Payment
is to be made within thirty days after liquidation of all retail
installment paper acquired from the dealer. The respondent
company is also directed to comply with any supplementary
decree entered on the subject of reserves.75
It is forbidden to enter into any agreement pursuant to which
it might finance wholesale shipments for a dealer without charge
in consideration of the dealer's agreement to patronize it for
72. Supra, p. 536 et seq.
73. Decree, par. 7(a).
74. See infra, p. 551.
75. Decree, par. 7 (b).
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retail financing in connection with the sale of automobiles not
financed by it at wholesale.76 This somewhat involved provision
requires explanation. Suppose Finance Company A is financing
ten cars at wholesale for a particular dealer. It anticipates (and
sometimes by contract may have the dealer's agreement) that
if any of these ten cars are sold on the installment plan the
dealer will sell the retail contract to Finance Company A.
Finance Company B might offer to finance two cars at whole-
sale free of charge in consideration of the dealer's agreement
that any retail paper resulting from the sale on the installment
plan of the ten cars financed by Finance Company A should be
sold to Finance Company B. This the decree forbids. The decree
does not interfere with the arrangement with Finance Company
A, nor would it interfere with Finance Company B's proposal
if it charged for the wholesale financing instead of doing it free.
The restrictions on joint visits7 have already been discussed.78
D. Reservation of Questions for Future Determination
Controversial Economic Points. The present decree involves
an important and highly controversial question relating to
dealer loss reserves.7' This matter has divided the industry
since before N. R. A. days, and defeated the attempt to frame
an N. R. A. code. It will be recalled that the indictment 0 dealt
with reserves and alleged that payment of a portion of the
finance charge to the dealer was concealed from the purchaser
and was used as a bonus for diverting the sale of retail paper
to the finance company, and that other finance companies were
compelled to engage in the same practice.
At least seven questions were involved: Does the provision
for, and payment of, loss reserves have anything to do with
the Sherman Act? Is it proper for dealers operating on the
recourse or repurchase plan to receive part of the finance charge
76. Decree, par. 7(c). It may be noted that this provision, and the
limitation of joint visits contained in par. 6(i) and 7(d), refer to matters
not specifically set forth in the indictment.
77. Decree, par. 7(d).
78. Supra, p. 542 et seq.
79. Supra, p. 582. It has been suggested that the Federal Trade Com-
mission should act as an adviser to the Department of Justice on eco-
nomic questions involved in consent decree negotiations. Donovan and
McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust
Laws (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 912, 913.
80. Supra, p. 586.
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as a loss reserve? Is it proper for dealers operating on the non-
recourse plan to receive part of the finance charge? Assuming
that it is proper for the dealer to receive part of the finance
charge on either or both of the above types of transaction, how
much should he receive and how should that amount be deter-
mined? Should the amount of the loss reserves be paid to the
dealer at the time of purchase of the retail paper or should they
be held by the finance company as security for the dealer's obliga-
tion to repurchase repossessed cars; and, if so, when should the
loss reserves be paid to the dealer? What disclosure to the pur-
chaser, if any, is proper with regard to the receipt by the dealer
of a portion of the finance charge? How could any restrictions
imposed on respondent finance company be also made applicable
to its competitors?
These problems were dealt with,31 not by appointing the Fed-
eral Trade Commission as a Special Master, but by reserving
the matter for future trial in case the Government should suc-
ceed by consent or litigated decree in limiting or restricting the
reserve practices of General Motors Corporation and General
Motors Acceptance Corporation. In other words, if no relief
is granted against the principal competitor of the defendant
manufacturer and its finance company subsidiary, then these
defendants are not to be subjected to further supplemental pro-
ceedings. If relief is granted, then the Government may apply
to the court in these cases to decide whether the practices of the
respondent finance company relating to reserves, considered in
combination with the other acts and practices of it and the manu-
facturer established before the court, violate the Sherman Act.
If such violation is discovered, the court is to decide what further
decree, if any, is necessary in order that respondent finance com-
pany's reserve practices may thereafter be within the Sherman
Act. The point of the last provision is to recognize that many
acts, lawful in themselves, may be objectionable if performed
in combination with other acts; and their continuation may be
free from objection if the other acts are discontinued. As a
decree is to be such as justice may "then" require, the court is
free to consider intervening changes. It is also expressly free
to consider the practices and volume of competitors.
This recognizes the distinction which exists in many anti-trust
81. Decree, par. 8.
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cases as to various practices which are made the subject of com-
plaint. The defendant may be willing to say it has never en-
gaged in, and does not desire to engage in, some of them, and
consequently may be willing to consent to their prohibition.
Others the defendant may justify, thereby permitting the solu-
tion of the case by disposing of the non-controversial points and
leaving the balance for subsequent investigation and determi-
nation.
It is a matter of regret that the Department did not embrace
the opportunity to demonstrate that the anti-trust laws are not
to be used for the purpose of binding a defendant and leaving
the complainant free. This could have been done in respect to
dealer reserves, which in this aspect was purely a matter of
intense competition between the complainant finance companies
and the respondent finance companies, by providing that any
supplemental decree shall be entered and be binding upon the
respondent finance company only when and to the extent that
substantially identical decrees are also entered against the com-
plainants."
Thus, the Department would have taken the position that,
with respect to a competitive practice, no relief will be given
to a complainant unless it is willing to abide by the same re-
strictions as are imposed upon the defendant. -This would be
a unique, salutary, and most important development in the
technique of anti-trust law enforcement. It tests the good faith
of complainants and would tend to prevent complaints under
the Sherman Act from being used as a method of unfair com-
petition.
Attention should be called to one other consideration, in so far
as binding complainants is concerned. Where a practice is ad-
mittedly lawful, unless perchance it forms part of an unlawful
conspiracy, the procedure of dealing with all elements of the
conspiracy are clear. For example, let us assume that the re-
spondent manufacturer and the respondent finance company are
engaged in interstate commerce and that, in violation of the
82. "A Court of equity 'in the exercise of its discretion, frequently re-
sorts to the expedient of imposing terms and conditions upon the party at
whose instance it proposes to act. The power to impose such conditions is
founded upon, and arises from, the discretion which the court has in such
cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction applied for. It is a power
inherent in the court, as a court of equity, and has been exercised from
time immemorial.'" Inland Steel Co. v. United States (1939) 59 S. Ct. 415.
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Sherman Act, they have agreed that the manufacturer shall rec-
ommend the respondent finance company and that respondent
finance company will pay to the dealers part of the finance
charge as a partial inducement to the dealers to follow the manu-
facturer's recommendation-all of this being assumed but not
conceded by the present respondents, who in the consent decree
asserted the truth of their answers and their innocence of any
violation of law.83 Now assume that the Department seeks to
impose a prohibition against payment of the reserves upon a
complainant finance company which has never been recom-
mended by the manufacturer and which has never received from
the manufacturer any other service or facility alleged to be
unlawful. It is obvious that the Department would have a diffi-
cult problem in imposing, through litigation, such a prohibition
upon this complainant. Therefore, adoption of any such prin-
ciple by the Department would serve warning that the complain-
ant who desires to restrict his competitor's practices (which are
entirely lawful when standing by themselves, and which are
subject to restriction only because they possibly form a part of
an entire program which has been called into question) must be
prepared voluntarily to accept a like restriction upon his employ-
ing the same practices.
New Statutes and State Laws. Provision is also made in the
decree for modification upon the application of the respondents
in order to conform the decree to any act of Congress hereafter
enacted,", or to permit respondents to conform to the obliga-
tions imposed by the laws or regulations of any state with which
the respondents must comply in order to do business therein.85
Review After Four Years. The rigidity of a consent decree,
unless the Government consents to its modification upon applica-
tion of the respondents, is exemplified by the statement of the
late Mr. Justice Cardozo, in United States v. Swift & Co.:
Nothing less than a clear showing of a grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with
the consent of all concerned. 8
83. Decree, par. 1.
84. Decree, par. 14.
85. Decree, par. 17.
86. United States v. Swift & Co. (1932) 286 U. S. 106, 119. The litiga-
tion referred to is the Federal Trade Commission investigation of the meat
packing industry. The court also said that "We reject the argument for
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The present consent decree provides that after four years
any respondent may apply to the court to vacate the entire
decree, or to vacate or modify any provision of the entire decree
on the ground that the commission or omission of any of
the agreements, acts or practices herein prohibited or re-
quired, under the economic or competitive conditions exist-
ing at the time of such application, does not constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce among the
states in automobiles within the meaning of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act as amended to the date of such application,
regardless of whether or not such economic or competitive
conditions are new or unforeseen. 87
Thus, the doctrine of the Swift case will have no bearing on
an application to modify this decree after it has been in effect
for four years.
E. Protection against Competitors Not Restrained by the Decree
Protection against competitors in respect to reserve practices
has just been discussed. There are other important provisions
on the subject of protection against competitors.
General Motors Corporation. A simultaneous indictment,88
was returned against General Motors Corporation and General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary
finance company. No consent decree has been entered against
them, and the case against them will probably be tried.
The present consent decree provides89 that the manufacturer
shall not purchase the securities of any finance company. It
was recognized that if General Motors were, nevertheless, free
to own a finance company, the respondent manufacturer might
be at a disadvantage in competition. The decree accordingly
provides'" that, if a final decree is not entered on or before Jan-
the intervenors that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a
contract and not as a judicial act." 286 U. S. at 115. See also United
States v. International Harvester Co. (1927) 274 U. S. 693; cf. Hodges v.
Snyder (1923) 251 U. S. 600 (relating to the modification of litigated
injunctions); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S. 1855)
18 How. 421. See Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.
(C. C. A. 2, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 182, for an instance of modification of a cease
and desist order upon consent of both parties; cf. Hatch v. Wallamet Iron
Bridge Co. (C. C. D. Ore. 1886) 27 Fed. 673. Donovan and McAllister,
supra, note 79, at 886-899.
87. Decree, par. 18.
88. United States v. General Motors Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1930).
89. Decree, par. 12.
90. Decree, par. 12.
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uary 1, 1941, requiring General Motors Corporation to divest
itself of all ownership and control of, and interest in, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, the court reserves jurisdiction
to modify the present decree so as to permit the manufacturer
to acquire ownership or control over or interest in a finance
company.
Recognition is further given to the fact that it may be im-
possible, or for other reasons inadvisable, to force the manu-
facturer to take this step in order to compete with another manu-
facturer owning its own finance company. Accordingly, a further
provision"' is contained in the decree to the effect that if, prior to
any divestment by General Motors Corporation of General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, the latter shall make available
to General Motors dealers a finance charge lower than that avail-
able to the manufacturer's dealers, then nothing in the decree
shall forbid the manufacturer to make adjustments, allowances,
or payments to its dealers who make available equally low finance
charges to their purchasers.
To explain the operation of this provision, it may be stated
that the current finance charge for new cars is six per cent of
the unpaid balance if payable in twelve monthly installments.
That is, if the balance to be paid is $500, and the customer de-
sires to make his total payment in twelve installments, the finance
charge would be six per cent of $500 or $30, so that the pur-
chaser's obligation would be $530, payable $44.17 a month.
If General Motors Corporation should decide to operate its
wholly owned finance company subsidiary on a non-profit basis
and to reduce the basis of the charge from six to four per cent,9 2
intending as a manufacturer to recoup out of increased sales
the profit which its finance company subsidiary lost by this re-
duction, the other manufacturers bound by the present consent
decrees might be severely handicapped. In this event, they are
free to say to their dealers, "The lowest finance charge available
to you from finance companies who will finance your sales is
$30; if you will only charge the purchaser $20, we will make
you an allowance of the $10 difference."
91. Decree, par. 12.
92. Compare the Robinson Patman Act (1936) 49 Stat. 1528, (1938)
Supp.) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13a, which provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commere * * * to sell, or contract to sell goods at
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or
eliminating a competitor."
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The effect of this provision is two-fold. In the first place,
it removes the premium which would otherwise exist on taking
advantage of a competitor which did not own a finance company.
Secondly, it would induce the dealers to patronize low-rate
finance companies. If Finance Company A wants $30 for financ-
ing a transaction and Finance Company B insists on $35, there
is no advantage in the dealer's patronizing Finance Company B,
and he will lose $5 by doing so, since the manufacturer will only
make up $10.
There is an additional and important provision in paragraph
twelve of the decree, making the continuance of the decree
depend upon the outcome of the General Motors litigation. It
provides that if the criminal proceeding against General Motors
finally terminates in any manner except by a conviction, the
restraints contained in the decree are to be suspended until
similar restraints are imposed upon General Motors Corporation
and its subsidiaries either by a consent decree or by a litigated
civil decree.93 It will be noted that the disputed question of
jurisdiction, i. e., whether the subject matter of this proceeding
is within the Sherman Act, will be determined as affecting the
parties to the consent decree by the outcome of the General
Motors case. In other words, if the General Motors litigation
results in a dismissal because there is no interstate commerce,
for example, then the consent decree must be vacated perma-
nently, since the same objection would prevent a civil injunction.
The same result will follow if it is held as a matter of law that
there is no "unlawful restraint." Failure to convict for other
reasons might merely suspend the consent decree until such time
as a civil decree is obtained.
The Department has thus far preferred to proceed against
General Motors Corporation by criminal rather than civil pro-
ceedings upon the theory that a criminal proceeding is the most
effective deterrent.94 Furthermore, it believes that a clear pro-
nouncement in the criminal proceedings that certain acts violate
the Sherman Act would establish the fact that a continuance
of such acts would be illegal and would amount to the equivalent
of a civil decree prohibiting their continuance. Accordingly, it
is provided" that a general verdict of guilty followed by the
93. Decree, par. 12a(1).
94. Supra, note 4.
95. Decree, par. 12a(2).
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entry of judgment shall be deemed to be a determination of the
illegality of any agreement, act, or practice of General Motors
Corporation which the trial court, in its instructions to the jury,
held to be a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of
guilty. A special verdict of guilty followed by the entry of judg-
ment shall be deemed to determine the illegality of any agree-
ment, act, or practice of General Motors Corporation which is
the subject of the special verdict; that is also true as to the plea
of nolo contendere or the plea of guilty. Such determination shall
be considered the equivalent of a decree restraining the perform-
ance by the General Motors Corporation of such agreement, act,
or practice unless or until the judgment is reversed or unless
the determination is based, in whole or in part, upon General
Motors' ownership of the finance company subsidiary or upon its
performance of the agreement, act, or practice in combination
with some other agreement, act, or practice with which the pres-
ent respondents are not charged.
In other words, if in its instructions to the jury the trial court
charges that it was a violation of the Sherman Act for General
Motors Corporation to recommend that its dealers patronize
General Motors Acceptance Corporation, and if a verdict of
guilty is returned on this charge, and such judgment is not
reversed on appeal, this is considered to be the equivalent of a
prohibition forbidding further recommendation by General
Motors Corporation of General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
However, General Motors Corporation had a profit motive in the
operations of General Motors Acceptance Corporation, whereas
Ford Motor Company had no profit motive in the operation of
Universal Credit Corporation. Accordingly, if the trial court's
charge should be that such recommendation violated the Sherman
Act, in whole or in part, because of the profit motive, then there
would be no determination that such recommendation would
violate the Act in the absence of the profit motive, and a con-
viction is accordingly not the equivalent of a decree. The same
is true if an act, charged to have been performed by both Gen-
eral Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company, was per-
formed by General Motors Corporation in combination with some
other act not charged against Ford Motor Company. Here, too,
a conviction of General Motors Corporation would determine
nothing about the legality of the act performed by itself. This
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provision is unique and may well offer difficulties in application.
It is difficult for lawyers to consider that a verdict and judg-
ment in a criminal case settles the law to the same extent as a
civil decree. However, in a non-technical sense, it is certainly
true that the final decision in a criminal case may establish that
a certain act is unlawful under a broad statute.96
After the entry of a consent decree, a final litigated decree,
a judgment of conviction against General Motors Corporation,
or after January 1, 1940 (whichever date is earliest), any re-
straints not imposed upon General Motors Corporation and
General Motors Acceptance Corporation by a decree or the equiv-
alent thereof are to be suspended as to the manufacturer until
such restraints are imposed either by a civil decree or by con-
viction which is the equivalent of such a decree, 97 as just indi-
cated. Of course, the decree would be suspended still earlier if
the criminal proceeding should end, otherwise than by a con-
viction, before January 1, 1940.
Other competitors. Provisions of the decree will be suspended
unless and until they are imposed upon competitors, who have
done twenty-five per cent of the volume of business of either
respondent, if the respondents are placed at a competitive dis-
advantage because such competitors are engaging in any of the
prohibited practices, and if the Department is not proceeding
with due diligence to obtain an adjudication as to illegality of
such competitors' practices. 8 Such suspension may be either
nation-wide or as to particular states.
F. The Consent Decree as Res Adjudicata
In view of the problem raised in Aluminum Co. of America v.
United States,** an express provision is contained in the de-
crees 1- to the effect that the decrees shall not be pleaded in bar
96. See Caminetti v. United States (1917) 242 U. S. 470, construing
(1910) 36 Stat. 825, (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 398.
97. Decree, par. 12a(3). Suspension of certain of the restraints will
require a showing that General Motors Corporation or its subsidiaries is
performing the prohibited agreement, act, or practice; these relate to the
payment for cars, the furnishing of documents of title, the furnishing of
office space and the making of contracts requiring dealers to use a par-
ticular finance company or class of finance companies or to use a particular
financing plan.
98. Decree, par. 15.
99. (1937) 302 U. 5. 230.
100. Decree, par. 13.
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as to matters arising after the date of entry of the decree, unless
such matters are covered by the decree, form part of the cause of
action, or are a repetition or continuance of matters which form
part of the cause of action pleaded in the complaint in the present
proceeding. 101
CONCLUSION
Consent decrees have been referred to as "law enforcement by
negotiation * * * the settlement by negotiation of economic ques-
tions of great public importance.102
Under the new technique of the Department, consent decrees
may be regarded as an enforcement by special legislation appli-
cable to individual industries, supplementing a statute applicable
to industry as a whole. This result follows from the recognition
by the Department that it is proper to impose like restraints
upon all major competitors in the industry, regardless of whether
they are proceeded against in the same proceeding. It would
follow, further, from the recognition by the Department, that
complainants, whether they are major competitors, should be
required to submit to the same restrictions which they seek to
have imposed upon others. Thus, without the N. R. A., there
is nevertheless the possibility of specialized legislative rules,
applicable to individual industries to govern special situations.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Department's phi-
losophy as to what constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act, or
its policy of inviting consent decrees which offer more than could
be obtained as a result of litigation, one can only commend the
Department's recognition of the principle of protecting a defen-
dant against competitive disadvantage. Similarly, one can only
commend the Department's recognition that some phases of a
complicated industry may not be solvable by consent decree and
should be reserved for further investigation and future deter-
mination.
101. Cf. Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio (1930) 281 U. S. 470;
Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips (1927) 274 U. S. 316; United States v.
California & Oregon Land Co. (1904) 192 U. S. 355.
102. Donovan and McAllister, supra, note 79, at 912.
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